Here are a few examples:
1. In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 90 (Tex. Nov. 2, 2007).
In this case, a man was killed when the Pirelli tire on a truck purchased in Texas failed, and the truck rolled over as a result. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the Texas trial court had to dismiss the case so it could be tried in a different country that was more convenient to Pirelli.
Justice Johnson disagreed with the majority of the Texas Supreme Court and wrote a separate opinion explaining why the Court should not have interfered with the trial court's jurisdiction:
I do not disagree with the Court's assessment that the evidence and the record reflect a clear, strong balance in favor of dismissing or staying the case on the basis of forum non conveniens. But the "strong balance" or even a "clear and overwhelming" balance of the Gulf Oil factors in favor of dismissing or staying the case does not overcome at least two considerations. First, balancing of the interests involved, including the private interests, is a function of the trial court to which we should defer unless there is no evidence in the record supporting or tending to support the trial court's decision. See Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. 2001) (recognizing that there is no abuse of discretion if some evidence supports the trial court's decision); Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682-83 (Tex. 1956) (orig. proceeding). Second, the Court's determination that a "strong" or "clear and overwhelming" balance of Gulf Oil factors favors dismissing or staying the case does not override the permissive discretion afforded the trial court by section 71.051(a) in light of section 71 .031's specific provision allowing suits such as this to be maintained in Texas. Quite simply, section 71.051(a) permitted, but did not command, the trial court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction granted by section 71.031 even if the case would more properly be heard in Mexico.... The trial court here simply decided to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it .... In short, we have said that the doctrine of forum non conveniens prevents a court from being compelled to hear a case over which it has jurisdiction. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1998). The Legislature did just that in section 71.051(a): it prevented the trial court from being compelled to hear a case even if it determined that in the interest of justice another forum would be more proper. The Court now directs the trial court to proceed in the opposite direction: to not hear a case over which the trial court had jurisdiction although the trial court refused to stay or dismiss the case as the Legislature gave it permission to do.... The trial court's decision to exercise jurisdiction specifically provided for by one statute and not withdrawn by another was not arbitrary, was not unreasonable, nor was it without reference to guiding principles. Accordingly, I would hold that its decision was not an abuse of discretion.
This is a very reasonable and fair-minded opinion.
2. Energy Service Co. of Bowie, Inc. v. Superior Snubbing Services, Inc., 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1045 (Tex. Aug. 24, 2007).
In this case, a seriously injured employee of an oilfield subcontractor settled claims against the oil producer and another subcontractor working on the site, and the producer and second subcontractor then sued the employer-subcontractor for reimbursement of that settlement through indemnity. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the employer-subcontractor's written agreement to indemnify the producer could be enforced by the second subcontractor who acted negligently even though the agreement was not executed by that negligent subcontractor.
Again, Justice Johnson disagreed with the majority of the Texas Supreme Court and wrote a separate opinion explaining why the Court should not have let the negligent subcontractor piggyback on the producer's indemnity agreement:
In my view, the plain meaning of the words used in section 417.004, "the employer is not liable to the third party for reimbursement or damages based on the judgment or settlement unless the employer executed, before the injury or death occurred, a written agreement with the third party to assume the liability" (emphasis added), is clear and unambiguous. The phrase "the third party" is used twice in the same sentence and clearly refers to the same third party in each instance-the third party seeking indemnity. Because the words "executed ... with the third party" in the statute are clear and unambiguous, we apply the words according to their plain and common meaning .... Further, we presume all the words in the statute were used purposely by the Legislature. ... If the words "with the third party" are omitted when reading the current language of section 417.004, then the section effectively provides the same as did the former statute: in order to be liable for indemnity to a settling third party, the subscribing employer must have executed a written agreement assuming the indemnity obligation before the injury, but the agreement was not required to have been with the third party seeking indemnity. ... In a similar vein, because the words "third-party beneficiaries" do not appear in the statute, we presume they were excluded for a purpose. Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 540. Only when it is necessary to give effect to clear legislative intent can we insert, by interpretation, additional words or requirements into a statutory provision. Id. And as the Court's opinion demonstrates, even if we look for legislative intent beyond the statutory language itself, we find no clear legislative intent that the words "executed ... a written agreement with the third party" were intended to encompass parties not signatories to an agreement.... First, the statute effectively provides that parties such as Mitchell who require indemnity agreements from subscribing employers may contract only for their own right to indemnity. That concept is not absurd. .... The benefit of a subscribing employer's immunity from claims by an injured employee is diminished whenever the employer is made subject to indemnity claims for common-law damages recovered by the injured employee from third parties. Narrowing the exception to immunity to those parties with whom the employer executed a written agreement is wholly consistent with the overarching theory of workers' compensation: immediate benefits to injured workers in exchange for employer immunity from claims. The former statute did not require the employer to have a pre-injury agreement "executed ... with the third party" before the employer could be called on for indemnity. ... In my view, the Court's construction of section 417.004:(1) does not comport with the literal, plain meaning of the statute; (2) dilutes subscribing employers' immunity from common-law damages claims of the employers' injured employees which is a key concept underlying the workers' compensation statutes; and (3) does not square with one of the main reasons for the 1989 revision of the workers' compensation statutes-reducing costs to subscribing employers. ... I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Once again, this is a very reasonable -- even somewhat pro-worker -- opinion.
3. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007).
In this case, a Utah guided-tour company specifically directed its marketing activity toward Texans, and specifically required paperwork to be filled out in Texas with the intention that this paperwork would give the Utah company the full benefit of Texas law. The Texas Supreme Court held that this Utah company could not be sued in Texas courts for the subsequent death of a Texas citizen who received the company's marketing and filled out its papers in Texas.
One more time, Justice Johnson disagreed with the majority of the Texas Supreme Court and wrote a separate opinion explaining why the Court should not allows this Utah company enjoy the benefits of doing business in Texas but also duck responsibility for its negligence in Texas:
Moki Mac is a Utah company which has conducted guided tours in the Grand Canyon for many years. In addition to general advertising and maintaining a website for potential clients to access, Moki Mac's efforts to attract customers include targeting ... Texas residents. As the Court sets out, some of Moki Mac's efforts which were directed toward Texas residents included regular advertising in Texas, hiring public relations firms to target media groups and tour operators in Texas, soliciting Texas residents through mass and targeted direct-mail campaigns, and utilizing particular customers to become de facto group leaders to plan, organize and promote Moki Mac trips. Moki Mac also has given discounted trip prices to some Texas clients .... Participants on Moki Mac's guided rafting and hiking trips engage in activities and encounter conditions which Moki Mac recognizes pose risks of injury and death. Its brochures ... identify certain risks, warn that enumerated risks and "other unknown or unanticipated risks may cause injury or death," and state that Moki Mac has taken reasonable steps to provide "appropriate equipment and/or skilled guides so you can enjoy an activity for which you may not be skilled." ... The Druggs received Moki Mac's brochures from a Texas acquaintance. After reviewing the brochures and corresponding with Moki Mac from Texas, the Druggs decided to allow thirteen-year-old Andy to go on one of the trips. ... Betsy and Andy signed the agreement in Texas and returned it to Moki Mac. ... Moki Mac considered the VAR agreement to have been effective when and where it was signed by the Druggs-in this case, Texas.... [T]he facts before us do not present a compelling case that Texas' exercise of jurisdiction over Moki Mac would be unreasonable. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. Moki Mac's conduct was particularly designed to and did increase the likelihood that Texas residents would respond favorably. Andy Drugg's death occurred while he was engaged in activities integral to the relationship Moki Mac induced by its efforts specifically directed toward Texas residents. Moki Mac should have reasonably foreseen that an injury to a client such as Andy while the client participated in activities integral to the relationship directly produced through Moki Mac's activities directed toward Texas residents would subject Moki Mac to being sued over the injury in Texas. There was a meaningful link between Moki Mac's actions directed toward Texas residents and the Druggs' suit. Accordingly, I would hold that the substance of the Druggs' suit is related to Moki Mac's activities which were purposefully directed toward Texas residents; ... it is not unreasonable or unfair to Moki Mac for Texas to exercise jurisdiction over Moki Mac as to the Druggs' suit.... I agree with the court of appeals' analysis and determination that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Moki Mac by Texas would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ... I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
This represents yet another very reasonable opinion that puts the rights of Texans ahead of the selfish interests of out-of-state corporations.
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